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ARGUMENT 
In its Cross-Appeal, Continental Bank relies on the 
following theories. Only the first two are treated in this reply 
brief as the third theory was not discussed by defendants in their 
reply brief: 
1. Defendants are Liable on the Signed Guarantees. 
The guarantees executed by defendants are valid 
even though some limited partners may not have 
executed guarantees. The guarantee is not 
conditioned on all limited partners being 
guarantors and the failure of some to execute 
guarantees does not affect the liability of 
those limited partners who signed. 
2. Defendants Contracted to Execute Guarantee 
Agreements. The evidence clearly shows that 
defendants intended and agreed to guarantee 
payment of the debt to Continental Bank and that 
they treated themselves as guarantors. 
Defendants are therefore bound by the terms of 
the written guarantees. 
3. Third Party Beneficiary Contract. In Section 
7.5 of the Partnership Agreement, defendants 
promised to (1) make additional capital 
contributions for the purchase of the press, and 
(2) guarantee the debt Color Craft incurred in 
acquiring the press. The trial court found that 
Continental Bank was a third party beneficiary 
of defendants' promise in Section 7.5 to make 
additional capital contributions. Continental 
Bank therefore necessarily is a third party 
beneficiary of defendants1 promise in Section 
7.5 to guarantee the debt Color Craft incurred 
in acquiring the press. (Respondent's Opening 
Brief, Section IX.) 
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I. THE SIGNED GUARANTEES ARE ENFORCEABLE EVEN THOUGH SOME 
GUARANTORS MAY NOT HAVE EXECUTED GUARANTEES. 
Citing State Bank of East Moline v. Cirivello, 386 
N.E.2d 43 (111. 1978), defendants contend that even the 
defendants who signed guarantees are relieved of liability on 
those guarantees because other limited partners did not execute 
guarantees. The Cirivello holding is a narrow one, however, and 
does not extend to the facts of this case. 
A. The Guarantees Were Not Conditioned on All Limited 
Partners Executing Guarantees. 
The holding in Cirivello was premised upon a factual 
determination that the creditor bank had agreed on a number of 
occasions that the loan the limited partners were guaranteeing 
"would not be advanced without the personal guarantees of all the 
limited partners . . . [and] that the guarantees would not become 
effective unless all thirteen [limited partners] signed." Id. at 
44, 47. In reliance on that agreement, 12 of the 13 limited 
partners executed guarantees. Despite this contractual 
condition, however, the bank advanced-the loan before receiving 
the guarantee of the thirteenth limited partner. Id,, at 45. 
Finding that the bank had not satisfied a contractual condition 
precedent, the court relieved the twelve limited partners of 
liability. 
Here, neither the advancement of the loan nor the 
enforceability of the guarantees was conditioned on all of the 
limited partners signing guarantees. In fact, the loan was 
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disbursed to Color Craft before Color Craft ever submitted the 
guarantees to the defendants for execution. (Exhibit 53 [Tab 8 
to Respondents Opening Brief], Transcript, p. 403). Therefore, 
unlike Cirivello, the advancement of funds was not conditioned on 
the receipt of guarantees from each limited partner. 
There was a loan condition that all limited partners 
would be guarantors but, quite simply, it was not a condition 
precedent as the loan was disbursed without any of the limited 
partner guarantees being executed. And each of the defendants 
knew as much as they received their guaranty forms for execution 
after the loan closed. Moreover, the asserted condition is 
contrary to the express language of the guarantees, which state 
that they are "continuing, absolute and unconditional"; and which 
contain a waiver of notice as to whether any other guarantee 
would be obtained. (Exhibit 46 [Appellant's Brief Tab 18]). In 
this case, the requirement that guarantees be executed by each 
limited partner was not a condition precedent to enforceability 
of the guarantees, but was rather "an additional obligation under 
the agreement which ran in favor of [the bank] and in no way 
affected [the signing guarantors] risk." Lawndale Steel Co. v. 
Appel, 423 N.E.2d 957, 961 (111. Ct. App. 1981). 
B. Liability of the Defendants Who Signed Guarantees 
Was Not Affected by the Failure of Other Defendants 
to Execute Guarantees. 
Cirivello is also distinguishable because its holding 
was premised on the finding that the bank's failure to obtain 
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guarantees from all of the limited partners "materially increased 
the proportionate liability of those who had signed." Cirivello, 
386 N.E.2d at 446-447. In Cirivello, although the guarantees 
provided for joint and several liability, the bank represented 
that each limited partner would be liable only for one-thirteenth 
of the loan obligation. As a result, when twelve limited 
partners signed instead of thirteen, each limited partner's 
liability was increased from one-thirteenth to one-twelfth of the 
partnership debt. 
Here, however, each signing defendant's liability 
remained the same whether he was the only person to execute a 
guarantee or whether all of the limited partners executed 
guarantees. Pursuant to the guarantees, each defendant's 
liability was limited to 150% of his prorata share of the debt, 
and the prorata shares of each limited partner were specified in 
the guarantee at the time they were executed. For example, the 
guarantee of Robert J. and Sue A. Allen, attached to Appellate's 
Brief as tab 22, provides as follows: 
. . . the obligations for which the undersigned 
herein guaranteed shall be limited to and shall 
not exceed one hundred fifty percent 150% of the 
undersigned's prorata share as a limited partner 
of Color Craft Press, Ltd. of the indebtedness 
of the amount of Exhibit "A". The Undersigned's 
prorata share is 3.58%. (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, regardless of how many limited partners executed 
guarantees, Continental Bank could look to the Aliens for 150% of 
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3,58% of Color Craft's indebtedness. Similarly, each of the other 
defendants' prorata shares were specified in their guarantee 
depending on how many units of Color Craft each defendant owned. 
The bank was not required to look to every limited partner for 
equal contribution, but instead could recover from any limited 
partner 150% of that limited partner's prorata share of Color 
Craft's obligation. As a result, each limited partner was 
obligated to Continental Bank for the full amount specified in the 
guarantee regardless of how many limited partners signed the 
guarantee. 
In summary, the guarantees defendants signed were not 
conditioned on the execution of a guarantee by every limited 
partner and the liability of each limited partner did not change 
depending on how many limited partners executed guarantees. 
Therefore, this case falls squarely within the confines of Appel, 
discussed fully in Section VILA, of Continental Bank's Opening 
Brief at pages 22-29, and the defendants who signed guarantees 
cannot avoid the liability they intended to undertake when they 
signed those guarantees. 
-^It is for this reason that the example on pages 11-12 of 
Defendants' Reply Brief is inaccurate. That example incorrectly 
assumes that Continental Bank is required to pursue equal 
contribution from all limited partners. That assumption is 
contrary to the percentage of the prorata share — 150% — 
specified in the guarantees. That 150% figure is significant 
because it shows that defendants were aware at the time the 
guarantees were signed that the defendants may not be required to 
contribute to the Color Craft debt in proportional shares. 
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C. Mount Prospect Does Not Stand for the Proposition 
For Which It Is Cited. 
Defendants contend that Mount Prospect State Bank v. 
Forestry Recycling, 417 N.E.2d 621 (111. Ct. App. 1981) extends 
the Cirivello holding to the facts of this case. It does not. In 
fact, the Court in Mount Prospect merely remanded back to the 
trial court for a factual determination as to whether the first 
"requirement" of Cirivello - that the guarantees and loan 
advancement be conditioned on all of the limited partners 
executing guarantees - was satisfied. 
In Mount Prospect, the trial court granted the creditor 
bank's motion for summary judgment against limited partners 
despite a factual dispute between the bank and the limited 
partners as to whether there was a condition precedent that all 
limited partners would become co-guarantors. Goldstein, the 
general partner, testified that the "bank had represented to him 
that it would not open the loan until all of the 25 limited 
partnership units were purchased and the purchasers had each 
provided personal guarantees." id. at 626. The bank, on the 
other hand, alleged that it had never represented to anyone that 
it was a condition precedent to making the loan that all of the 
limited partners execute guarantees. There was also a factual 
dispute as to whether the bank had opened the loan without 
receiving a guarantee from each limited partner. 
After discussing the holding in Cirivello, the court 
found: 
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[a] genuine issue of material fact . . . as to 
whether a condition to the contracts of 
guarantee was that all of the limited partners 
become co-guarantors . . . [and] a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether this condition 
was met. 
Id. at 629. The court therefore remanded the case back to the tri 
al court. 
The appellate court in Mount Prospect did not extend 
Cirivello, it simply sent the matter back to the trial court for 
a determination as to whether the "first" requirement of 
Cirivello was satisfied. Because there was a genuine factual 
dispute as to whether that requirement was met and as to whether 
all the limited partners had executed guarantees, the Mount 
Prospect court did not even reach the issue of whether any 
missing guarantee "materially increased" the other limited 
partners obligations on the guarantee. Mount Prospect simply did 
not reach the proposition for which it has been cited. 
II. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT BAR THE LIABILITY OF ANY 
OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
A. Sufficient Written Memoranda Exist to Satisfy the 
Statute. 
Defendants' claim that the statute of frauds precludes 
liability of the non-signing defendants. The requirements of that 
statute have been fully met, however as written memoranda do exist 
which set forth the essential terms of defendants' agreement to 
guarantee Color Craft's debt to R&P. Such written memoranda are 
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signed by defendants1 agent and satisfy the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-4. 
Amendment No. 4, to Certificate of Limited Partners of 
Color Craft Press, Ltd., Exhibit 80, provides: 
[t]he Class B Limited Partners have agreed 
to personally guarantee repayment of indebtedness 
incurred by the Partnership to acquire such 
printing press and associated equipment; 
provided, however, the maximum amount guaranteed 
by any Class B Limited Partner shall not exceed 
150 percent of such Limited Partners* pro rata 
share of the total indebtedness with Roberts and 
Porter, Inc. 
Amendment No. 4 at 1f 7 (emphasis added). William G. O'Mara 
acting as attorney-in-fact on behalf of each of the limited 
partners executed this amendment. 
Amendment No. 5 to Certificate of Limited Partnership of 
Color Craft Press, Ltd., Exhibit 91, contains the same provision 
concerning the limited partners* guaranty agreements. A. V. 
Moxley, acting as attorney-in-fact for the limited partners, 
executed this amendment. 
Taken together, these documents satisfy the statute of 
frauds as the quoted paragraph which appears in both Amendments 4 
and 5 identifies the parties to the guaranty agreements: the 
limited partners of Color Craft; specifies the consideration 
underlying the original obligation and the consideration for the 
guarantees: the sale of the printing equipment to Color Craft and 
the financing of the sale; and recites the essential terms of the 
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guaranties. See, e.g., Hoffman v. S.V. Co., Inc., 628 P.2d 218 
(Idaho 1981). 
Although neither Amendment No. 4 nor Amendment No. 5 
specify the amount of indebtedness owing to Continental Bank, to 
the extent necessary, the partnership agreements (Exhibits 79 and 
90) can be read in conjunction with the Amendments and flesh out 
the relative interests of the partners in the partnership. These 
documents, when read together, identify each limited 
partner/guarantor's obligations with such particularity that it 
cannot be confused with or claimed to apply to any other debt. 
Matter of Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 549 (Utah 1979). 
When more than one writing is used to satisfy the 
requirements of the statute of frauds, some nexus between the 
writings must be established. "This requirement may be satisfied 
. . . by implied reference gleaned from the contents of the 
writings and the circumstances surrounding the transaction . . . 
[P]arol evidence may be used to connect an unsigned document to 
one that has been signed by the person to be charged." Greqerson 
v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980). Here the Amendments and 
the partnership agreement adequately define each defendants' 
obligation to guarantee repayment of a portion of Color Craft's 
indebtedness to R&P and the relative ownership interests of the 
defendants. The nexus between these documents is clear as the 
Amendments are statutory certificates which evidence the existence 
of the partnership created by the partnership agreement. With 
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that established, reading them as a unit is entirely appropriate. 
Thus, there is. a writing within the meaning of the Statute of 
Frauds that establishes defendants' agreements with sufficient 
detail that the Statute of Frauds will not bar imposition of 
liability against all of the defendants. 
B. Continental Bank Has Fully Performed Its Obligations 
to Finance The Purchase of the Press, Thus The 
Statute of Frauds Is Inapplicable. 
Relying upon defendants' promises to guarantee Color 
Craft's debt to Continental Bank and Cullimore's assurances that 
the guaranties would be obtained, Continental Bank provided 
financing to the partnership for the purchase of Press B. Because 
Continental Bank has fully performed its agreement to provide 
Color Craft with financing. That performance takes the guarantee 
agreements outside the statute of frauds and allows the agreements 
to be enforced. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forebearance on the 
part of the promisee or a third person and which 
does induce the action or forebearance is 
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds 
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement 
of the promise. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 139(1)(1981). 
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III. THE GUARANTEES WERE VALIDLY ASSIGNED AND ARE ENFORCEABLE 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS, 
A. The Guarantees were Validly Assigned by R&P to 
Continental Bank. 
Defendants contend that although R&P assigned to 
Continental Bank all of its rights in the purchase contracts, 
promissory notes and security agreements executed by Color Craft, 
the guarantees defendants subsequently executed to secure 
performance of the purchase contract were not assigned to 
Continental Bank. It is clear, however, that the "transfer of 
the underlying principal obligation operates as an assignment of 
the guarantee." Schroeder v. Hunter-Douglas, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 
746, 749 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). The underlying debt simply 
"carries with it" any method of securing that debt, even if that 
method is not specifically included in the assignment. See 
National Market Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 P. 1009, 1010 
(Wash. 1918). As a result, R&P's assignment of the underlying 
obligation effectively transferred to Continental Bank all of 
R&P's remedies available to collect the obligations owed, 
including enforcement of the defendants' individual guarantees. 
B. The Assignment Did Not Render Defendants' 
Guarantees Unenforceable. 
Defendants contend that even if effectively assigned, 
the guarantees are unenforceable because (1) the guarantees did 
not exist at the time of the assignment; (2) guarantees are 
generally not assignable; and (3) the assignment materially 
altered defendants' liability as guarantors. None of such claims 
are valid. 
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1. The guarantees executed after the assignment of the 
purchase contract were validly assigned. 
Defendants' guarantees were validly assignable even 
though they were not executed until after Continental Bank was 
assigned the purchase contract and promissory notes. First, 
guarantees are simply a means of securing an underlying 
obligation (the purchase contract which defendants concede was 
validly assigned) and as such are "carried with" the assignment 
of that obligation. Moreover, although "things not in existence" 
were not assignable at common law, such assignments are valid in 
equity. . ." See 6A C.J.S., "Assignments," § 14, pp. 605-606. 
2. Guarantees are assignable under Illinois law. 
Although defendants suggest that "[u]nder Illinois law 
guarantees are generally not assignable at all (Reply Brief of 
Appellants, p. 24), the cases upon which they rely expressly hold 
that guarantees are assignable unless "the essentials of the 
original contract have been changed and the performance of the 
principal is materially different from that first contemplated." 
See Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Stephens, 422 N.E.2d, 1136, 
1139 (111. Ct. App. 1981); Schranz v. I. L. Grossman, Inc., 412 
N.E.2d 1378, 1384-85 (111. Ct. App. 1980). As shown below, the 
assignment by R&P to Continental Bank did not materially increase 
defendants1 obligations under the guarantees and, in fact, the 
assignment was made in accordance with the provisions of the 
purchase contract and the guarantees. 
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3. The Assignment Did Not Affect Defendants 
Obligations Under the Guarantees, 
Citing Harris Trust, defendants contend that the 
assignment of the purchase contract was ineffective because it 
materially changed defendants* obligations under the guarantees 
in that a provision in the purchase contract prevented defendants 
from asserting defenses it may have against R&P in any action 
brought by an assignee of R&P. Defendants' argument is 
illogical. The alteration of a guarantor's liability results in 
unenforceability of a guarantee only if (1) there is a material 
alteration in the principal contract, (2) after the execution of 
the guarantee contract, and (3) the alteration was made without 
the guarantor's consent. See Appel, 423 N.E.2d at 963. If those 
three conditions are met, a novation occurs and a new principal 
contract is deemed to exist to which the guarantor is not bound. 
In this case, however, defendants have not and cannot establish 
any of the three necessary requirements. 
First, the assignment did not result in any alteration 
of the principal obligation (the purchase contract). In fact, 
the alleged alteration is contained in the purchase contract 
which the defendants stipulated that they intended to guaranty. 
They agreed to the terms of the already existing purchase 
contract when they executed their guarantees and they cannot now 
contend that an assignment pursuant to an express provision in 
the purchase contract materially altered their obligations as 
guarantors. 
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In addition, the assignment to Continental Bank occurred 
before the guarantees were submitted by Color Craft to defendants 
for execution. As a result, at the time they executed the 
guarantees the defendants knew, or are deemed to have known 
through their general partner, the terms of the purchase 
contract, that R&P was not the financier of the purchase, and 
that the underlying obligations of Color Craft to R&P had been 
assigned to Continental Bank. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, defendants 
consented to the assignment when they executed the guarantees. 
Paragraph 5 of the guarantees provides as follows: 
Seller [R&P] may, from time to time, without 
notice to guarantor, assign or transfer the 
[purchase] contract and any or all of the 
"equipment" therein described; and, notwith-
standing any such assignment or transfer or any 
subsequent assignment or transfer thereof, the 
liabilities represented thereby shall be and 
remain liabilities for the purposes of this 
guarantee, and each and every immediate and 
successive assignee or transferee of any of the 
liabilities or of any interest therein shall, to 
the extent of the interest of such assignee or 
transferee as if such assignee or transferee 
were seller. . . 
It is well established that "a guarantor is not released by a 
change in the underlying contract where it is made in accordance 
with a provision of the guarantee." Florentine Corporation, Inc. 
v. Pepa I, Inc. 339 S.E.2d 112, 114 (S.C. 1985) (citing 38 C.J.S. 
"Guarantee," Section 73 (1943)); see also Security National Bank 
v. Sloane, 648 P.2d 861, 864 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). Therefore, the 
-14-
assignment pursuant to paragraph 5 of the guarantee does not 
render the guarantee ineffective. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD REFORM THE GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS. 
Defendants misunderstand what action is sought by 
Continental Bank in its request that the court reform the 
guarantee agreements. What the bank seeks is an Order changing 
the name of the party whose debt is guaranteed from the name of 
the guarantor to Color Craft Press, Ltd. 
Each of the guarantee agreements contains, in the second 
full paragraph, the following: 
Seller and , an individual 
("Buyer"), propose to execute and deliver 
Equipment Contract Purchase Agreement dated 
providing for the purchase by 
Seller to Buyer of Printing Machinery described 
in Exhibit "A" therein described and attached. 
(Ex 46 [Appellant's Opening Brief Tab 18]). 
As stipulated in the pretrial order, Cullimore inserted 
the name of the guarantors in the first blank and the date of the 
execution of the Equipment Purchase Agreement in the second 
blank. Instead, he should have inserted in the first blank the 
name of Color Craft Press, Ltd., the limited partnership, which 
was the purchaser under the equipment contract. 
The facts with respect to this issue are uncontroverted. 
The Guarantee Agreement was filled in by Cullimore and that he 
made the mistake of inserting the guarantors name in the blank 
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where he should have inserted the name of Color Craft Press, Ltd. 
(Pretrial Order 1f 5(d)(18)(20)). Cullimore understood that the 
purchaser of the press would be the partnership and that it was 
the partnership obligation which needed to be guarantied. 
(Pretrial Order If 5(d)(21)). McMillin testified that Cullimore 
retyped the guarantees, modifying a form submitted by him from 
Continental Bank. (Transcript, p. 366). As well, Cullimore 
testified that he sent the guarantee agreements to the limited 
partners with none of the blanks filled in and that he filled them 
in upon their return by the signors. (Transcript, pp. 253-254.) 
Each of the defendants who returned agreements to Cullimore in 
blank understood that he or Color Craft would fill in the blanks. 
(Pretrial Order, If 5(d)(19)). He thought they were prepared 
correctly. (Pretrial Order, M 5(d)(24)). 
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts it is clear that 
in filling in the blanks in the guarantee agreements Cullimore 
erred, thus creating much of the confusion which has existed in 
this case. Quite simply, Continental~Bank asks that the Court 
reform the guarantee agreements to correct the error of Mr. 
Cullimore. There was never any doubt in his mind, nor is there a 
reasonable basis for doubt in the minds of the limited partners, 
based upon the stipulated facts, as to whose debt they were being 
asked to guarantee. They have stipulated they intended to 
guarantee the debt of Color Craft for its purchase of the press. 
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Reforming the guarantee agreements to reflect that intent is 
entirely appropriate. 
The defendants claim that Continental Bank seeks, as 
well, to have the guarantee agreements reformed to state the 
amount of the indebtedness guarantied. In fact, reformation as to 
the amount of the indebtedness is not necessary as the amount is 
clearly set forth in Exhibit A attached to the printing machinery 
contract which is incorporated by reference in the guarantee 
agreement. The exhibits attached to that contract consist of a 
number of pages which describe in detail the purchase terms for 
the equipment contract. Those exhibits were introduced at trial 
as a separate exhibit, #41. Additionally, those exhibits were 
attached to the Purchase Contract, Exhibit 42A. (They are 
2 
attached to appellant's opening brief as Tab 13). 
Harry McMillin testified without contradiction that those 
documents constituted the exhibits to the purchase contract 
(Transcript, P. 324) and that although the schedule of payments 
was labeled Exhibit "D" to the Purchase Contract, such schedule 
was the schedule evidencing how much was due to be paid. Thus, 
^Defendants have made much of their supposed lack of 
knowledge of the amount they were being asked to guarantee. It is 
interesting that the alleged condition precedent to the purchase 
requiring the personal guarantee of each limited partner is 
contained in the very document which also sets forth in detail the 
purchase price for the equipment. 
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contrary to the claim of defendants, Continental Bank does not 
need to have the guarantee agreements reformed to state the amount 
due, rather that amount is clearly referenced in the exhibits 
attached to the purchase contract. When the purchase contract, 
guarantees and Exhibit 36 offering letter are viewed together as a 
group, there can be no question as to the amount of the purchase 
price and thus the amount guaranteed. There is, therefore, no 
need for reformation on this issue. 
V. BOTH CULLIMORE AND COLOR CRAFT ARE OBLIGATED ON THE 
PROMISSORY NOTES. 
Defendants are hard pressed to argue that the debt for 
the purchase of the printing press was not a debt of Color 
Craft. The stipulated facts at trial were that "Color Craft and 
R&P entered into a machinery contract" for the purchase of the 
Nebiolo Press & Muller-Martini binder, that "each of the 
documents executed by Color Craft evidencing the purchase of the 
Nebiolo Press and Muller-Martini binder was executed on behalf of 
Color Craft by William G. O'Mara, the president of Color Craft 
Press, Inc., the managing general partner of Color Craft," and 
that "Color Craft executed promissory notes and security 
agreements by which it promised to pay the sums due to R & P on 
the Nebiolo Press and Muller-Martini binder. . . . " [Appellants 
Opening Brief, tab 2, p. 9]. The fact that the promissory notes 
were signed by Cullimore personally, as well as by Color Craft, 
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via its President O'Mara, indicates that both Color Craft and 
Cullimore are obligated for repayment of the indebtedness. In 
addition, Cullimore admits that he intended to be personally 
liable for 100% of the indebtedness evidenced by the promissory 
notes, (Transcript pp. 203, 208 and 248; Exhibit 36, p. 420121 
[Respondents Brief, tab 5]) and he signed a separate guarantee as 
to each promissory note. Exhibits 43, 44, (Respondents Brief, 
tab 6). 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in Respondents* opening brief, this Court 
should sustain the lower court's entry of judgment on the 
third-party beneficiary contract to make additional capital 
contributions and should remand the case to the trial court with 
instructions to enter judgment against each defendants as a 
guarantor of the indebtedness of Color Craft to Continental Bank. 
DATED this <-u day of June, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Anthony \fJ. Schofield 
Attorneys for Continental Illinois 
National Bank & Trust Company 
of Chicago 
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